Civil Society Roles in Governing Disaster Reduction: Case Study from National and Local Levels in Indonesia

Jonatan A. Lassa  
(Institute of Resource Governance and Social Change, Kupang)

Dominggus Elcid Li  
(Institute of Resource Governance and Social Change and Nusa Cendana University)

Rudi Rohi  
(Institute of Resource Governance and Social Change, and Nusa Cendana University)

Yos Boli Sura  
(Institute of Resource Governance and Social Change, Kupang)

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Author(s): Jonatan A. Lassa, Dominggus Elcid Li, Rudi Rohi, Yosef Boli Sura
(Corresponding author: jonatan.lassa@irgsc.org)
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Saut S. Sagala

Institute of Resource Governance and Social Change
RW Monginsidi II, No 2B Kelapa Lima
Kupang, 85227, NTT, Indonesia
www.irgsc.org
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Jonatan A. Lassa, Dominggus Elcid Li, Rudi Rohi, Yosef Boli Sura

Abstract. Risk governance concept promotes the empirical power (such as government, market and civil society) that co-exists to govern risk and catastrophe. This paper highlights evidence of disaster risk governance at national and local levels in Indonesia. Drawing upon the strength of social network approach, it specifically analyzes and presents the network of actors in disaster risk reduction policy reform in Indonesia where civil society plays vital roles. Two case studies are provided to exemplify the roles of civil society at local level. The paper concludes that disaster risk reduction policy reform at different levels in Indonesia have been equally coproduced by civil society, local governments, national government and international actors.

Key words: social network analysis, civil society, disaster governance, risk governance, disaster policy making process, legitimacy, Indonesia.

1. Introduction

Academic literature on risk governance and disaster governance often suggests a ‘common agreement’ that are borrowed from the study on governance that originally invented by political and social science in general). Governance of risk and catastrophe promotes the idea that there is empirical power (such as government, market, civil society, science) that co-exists to govern risk and catastrophe (Lassa 2011, Tierney 2012).

Proponents of risk governance frameworks, such as of the Institute of Risk Governance Council (IRGC) suggest that risk governance encompasses risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication, which requires fundamental understanding of formal and informal institutions, social-economic contexts within which risk is evaluated, and the involvement of actors and stakeholders who represent them in political and policy arenas that range from the local to the global level (Renn and Walker 2008:334, Renn 2008a). The stakeholders and actors range from grassroots communities, to civil society, executive government and legislators, international financial institutions, and United Nations and university-based experts or academics. The term civil society can mean both the general civil society at large or simply civil society organizations (CSOs) such as non-governmental organization (NGOs), community based organization (CBOs) and others.

Rayner (2007:165) suggests that risk may shift responsibility from governmental to private sector and NGO actors, while at the same time as risk can facilitate government control over citizens. He further argues that “control by government is seen to have been supplemented, if not replaced, by a more distributed form of governing usually referred to by the term ‘governance’—defined as the management of a system, usually political or organizational, involving mutual adjustment, negotiation, and accommodation between the parties involved rather than direct control.”

UNDP defines governance as “the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their
legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences. It brings together the actions of state, non-state, and private sector actors” (UNDP 2004). In addition, it categorizes risk governance into three categories: Firstly, economic governance, which means decision-making processes that affect a country’s economic activities and their implications for equity, poverty (including risk), and quality of life. Secondly, political governance, which is the process of decision making to set legislative processes, formulate laws, regulation, and policies, and which is referred to by the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) as institutional basis for implementation by member states of the UNISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction). Lastly is administrative governance is defined as the system of policy implementation that requires the existence of well-functioning government organizations at the national and local levels, and which play roles as enforcers of regulations related to disaster mitigation, building code enforcement, land use planning, environmental risk, and human vulnerability monitoring and safety standards (see UNDP 2004:1975).

At operational level, governance has been simplified as (and to some degree complemented by) “good governance characteristics” such as participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision in regard to disaster risk reduction (UNDP 2004:75). UNDP views good governance as the commitment to sharing decision-making power among the stakeholders in disaster risk reduction, where government remains critical actors in reducing risk as well as in the broader development context, based on its capacity as a mediator between private and public interests and as well as the people at risk, ranging from the local to the international level.

National and local disaster risk governance means governing and managing disaster risk beyond government’s hierarchy at different levels of jurisdiction and category of actors. This paper suggests that the success of a DRR-PMP is among others partly measured by legitimacy principles. Legitimacy principle in DRR policy making means ‘rightfulness’ of decision process or the extent to which the policy making process is accepted by the participants (Lassa 2008) as fair or unfair (Cash et al 2002). Its synonymous is ‘technology of participation’ which is often ignored by top down disaster risk governance. Legitimacy may also mean how one DRR policy stakeholder perceives the policy making process as unbiased and should be politically and procedurally correct and fair. It ‘involves the belief that a policy making process is “fair” and consider appropriate values, interests, concerns, and specific circumstances from multiple perspectives’ (Cash et al 2002: 5).

2. Research Objectives and Methods

This research aims to understand disaster risk reduction policy making process (DRR-PMP) at national and local levels in Indonesia. At national level, DRR-PMP refers to the birth of national law concerning disaster risk management namely Public Law 24/2007 (hereinafter PL 24/2007) which is the landmark of the national disaster policy reform. We therefore analyze the emerging roles of civil society organizations (CSOs) in DRR-PMP.

Down at the local level study on the roles of CSOs in DRR-PMP is based on a case study from East Flores, Indonesia, where we are based recently involve in data collection. The East Flores case refers to the roles of local CSOs in encouraging local government of East Flores to ratify the PL 24/2007 by endorsement of new East Flores Local Laws (namely Perda No
5/2011 (hereinafter EFLL 5/2011). EFLL 5/2011 is marked as one of the most important step of DRR policy reform in East Flores.

The finding in the next sections is based on a single research question: what are the roles of civil society organization in governing disaster reduction at different levels in Indonesia?

The study is based on literature reviews. The data from the national level case study in Section 4 is borrowed from Lassa (2011). The origin of the data for the analysis is taken from National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction 2006-2009, endorsed by the Ministry of Development Planning (Bappenas) with the support from UNDP.

Some part of the local level case study is based on the findings from (Heriyanto and Lassa 2011). However, the whole risk governance network data were re-coded by the authors.

In analyzing the actual disaster risk governance actors, we use social network analysis [See Annex 1]. The network analysis is possible because there is a long shopping list in the plan with a simple format: “who is doing what with whom with the support of whom and where.”

SNA suggests that a network is a set of nodes and links where each link connects two nodes or more. We will be using Pajek as the SNA software (See Nooy et. al. 2005). Only two SNA measures will be used in this study. The first is the measure of degree or the number of links or ties one actor possesses in a given network. This is to assess the degree of connectivity of any actor in question relative to the other in a given network. The second is Betweenness Centrality, which basically measures the level of influence or any actor who are the 'true leaders' in a network. Technical details of the methods can be accessed via Nooy et. al. 2005. Some online assessment on the network can be also found at pajek.imfm.si/doku.php.

3. Civil Society Roles at National Levels

The Hyogo Framework for Action considers disaster legislation as a foundation that provides a strong basis for planning and directing of the whole spectrum of disaster risk reduction at different levels. Within the context of Indonesian national regulation, Undang-Undang (Public Laws) provides the legal basis for the auxiliary regulations as it creates rules of the game for the lower level regulation.

At all levels, the legislative agency should play roles not only for policy drafting and budgeting but also for monitoring the implementation of public laws. The national legislative body used their initiative rights for DRR-PMP especially the drafting of disaster management law namely PL 24/2007. It was part of the response to the loud outcry from non-state actors to create a disaster management law in 2005, and, as many commentators believe, such initiative rights have seldom been used by Indonesian legislators (Lassa 2011).

The legislative response to the call for reform was indeed conditioned by recent large-scale disasters, which have created significant economic losses over the last decade. One might think it is unrealistic to expect Indonesian legislators to compete with the executive government who have gained more technocratic capacity to draft innovative laws. In addition, the practice of political opposition is not yet fully developed in the country, even though it is possible by law or in the words of experts, opposition practice in Indonesia “remains structurally weak and divided.” (Aspinall 2000).
Central government ministries have been literally considered as “leaders” together with United Nations organizations and some international NGOs, international donors, main university/research institutes, and media outlet. However, result from the SNA suggests their levels of leadership or influence (as indicated by the size of the nodes - the larger the node the larger the influence or centrality or actual power) in the DRR Reform network vary considerably. For instance, Bakornas emerges as the most dominant actor followed by the leading research institute on disaster mitigation, namely, Bandung Institute of Technology (node 1), UNESCO (node 17), Ministry of Public Works (node 13), and Indonesian Society for Disaster Management (MPBI) (the leading national NGO on DRR during the period - see node 7th).

Figure 1. DRR Network in Indonesia 2006-2009

There are certain organizations that are more important than others; however, in the network they are distinguished by their “leadership roles” (measured by betweenness centrality test in Pajek). It is important to note that a network analysis like this neither represents the whole society nor the whole DRR networks. Rather, it shows how each actor/organization/institution is linked in a certain network informed by our collected data - in this case, the DRR network suggested by the data from National Action Plan 2006-2009.

Among all of the national NGOs in the network, MPBI (Indonesian Disaster Management Society) has been able to “lead” in view of its values of leadership or centrality (indicated by the size of the nodes) - this means they have obtained their leadership status in the network during the period of 2006-2009.

Sometimes, key donors are not mapped out in the network but their actual importance should not be underestimated. This includes some local actors that are simply modest (in the size of the nodes) in the network, but may have roles that are crucial to the network. Modest nodes can be the funders such as UNDP which have been one of the key actors and one of the prime sponsors behind the reform, got a modest rank.
Out of the top 20 actors (measured by influence), nine are governmental organizations, four are United Nations agencies, three are universities, and one is a national NGO (i.e. MPBI, node 7, – one of the main initiators behind the reform).

UN agencies and INGOs supported civil society advocacy under the lead of MPBI (see also BNPB-UNDP 2009:12-13) to carry out “exhaustive” consultation processes with international partners, politicians, national legislators, and government, especially Bakornas and civil society at large (Pujiono 2005). Consultation processes with international actors were known as the Convergence Group, which was later supported by UNDP to form a working group for a background academic paper for law drafting. The Working Group members were all international organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), CARDi1, ECHO, Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC). International aid interests have been successfully accommodated in the law, which was later enforced through a specific regulation, namely, Government Regulation 21/2008 on International Cooperation in Disaster Management (see BNPB-UNDP 2009:13).

Some positive outcomes of the international and non-state actors’ involvement in the drafting of the law lie in the details of the DM Law document. The law recognizes the government’s responsibility: (a) to reduce disaster risks and integrate risk reduction in development programs; (b) to protect people from disasters; (c) to guarantee provision of rights of people affected and displaced by disasters according to minimum standards; (d) recovery from the impact of disasters; (e) allocating budget for disaster management in the country’s Annual Development Budget; (f) allocating contingency budget for disaster response, and (g) authentic and credible documentation of hazards and impact of disasters.

4. DRR-PMP in East Flores, Indonesia

4.1. Risk Context of East Flores, East Nusa Tenggara Province

In 1992 Flores’ tsunami, some of its coastal parts were damaged. In Riangkroko (Southwest), the height of inundated tsunami was above 18m in many points. In Lato Beach, tsunami height was 3.5 to 6.9 m – some communities that escaped from tsunami by running to higher ground were found buried alive by the landslides triggered by the same earthquakes that caused the 1992 tsunami. In Larantuka (Southeast of East Flores), the tsunami height was 1.6 meters (Imamura and Gica 1994, Imamura and Gica 1996).

The district of East Flores is also situated surrounding four active volcano lines namely: Mount Male Lewotobi (1.584m ASL) located and Mount Female Lewotobi (1.703m ASL) located in the eastern part of Flores Island; Mount Leraboleng (1.117m ASL) located in Flores Island; Mount Ile Boleng (1.659m ASL) located in Adonara Island. The physical landscape of East Flores is generally mountainous marked with slopes. Such geological condition combines with dry climate make East Flores is susceptible to landslides and floods too. During rainy season, landslides and floods often occur and interrupt the land transportation. Its dry season usually last for 9 to 10 months and the rainy season is relatively short between 2 to 3 months. The annual precipitation rate is uneven in the East Flores with average precipitation rate of 1,263 mm/year. Number of rainy days is recorded

1 Consortium for Assistance and Recovery towards Development in Indonesia.
between 51-105 days per year (Lassa 2009). In 2007, rainy days in Titehena district (Titehena station) was recorded only for 37 rainy days. The highest was in East Solor Island where it was recorded 112 and in West Solor was 58 days. 2005 and 2007 data demonstrate that East Flores is very dry and exposed to long duration of sunny days (above 80%) during May-October Flores Timur in Figures 2008).

East Flores capital, the Larantuka town, is built under the legs of Mount Ile Mandiri. The dormant volcano contains unstable waterlogged top soil which become vulnerable ‘natural dams’ that can be easily collapsed when there is a sudden extreme rainfall continuously occur. On 27 February 1979, there was four days rainfall intensity recorded a total of 251mm which occurred in a short period of time with a peak at 180mm. The sudden high rainfall events triggered flash floods because some of the unstable natural waterlogged areas collapsed. At least 20 villages affected and 8 were heavily damaged. Almost a hundred of people died, 53 missing, hundreds severely wounded and suffered minor injuries. The livelihood assets loss included 260 candlenut trees, 1,750 hectares of food crops, 1,200 coconut trees and 843 livestock died, 14 public buildings collapsed, 461 private buildings collapsed and 74 buildings severely damaged and 8,750 people displaced. It was estimated that 50% of Larantuka had been damaged (Lassa 2009).

4.2. Local CSO involvement in DRR-PMP in East Flores

Local government of East Flores had no clear disaster policy and risk reduction planning. Since the 1979 disaster, the status quo have remained ignorance of DRR as the local government reactively response to disasters after emergency take places. Comprehensive disaster mitigation and preparedness barely occur.

Starting since October 2009, Oxfam and YPPS (Social Research and Development Foundation) agreed to cooperate in a project namely “Building Resilience” (hereinafter BR Project) with the support of the Government of Australia through Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction. This project aims to reduce loss of live and livelihoods through DRM capacity building for the communities, local government and civil society. The program also aims to build capacity of local government in three aspects: DRR knowledge, planning and implementation. The overall goal is that the empowered local government in DRR will be able to mobilize resources (from local to national) in order to reduce multiple vulnerability dimensions. The disaster risk management reform in East Flores has been designed through:

- Facilitate coordination among relevant stakeholders at Kabupaten level concerning DRR implementation, monitoring and reporting.
- To ensure that disaster risk assessment is conducted and the result is disseminated to local government, NGOs and relevant CSOs in East Flores.
- Strong basis of DRM implementation through legitimate local regulation and local institutions indicated by the endorsement of new local legislation on DRM and the establishment of BPBD office.
- Risk and hazards maps (including vulnerability and capacity mapping) are made available and disseminated.
- Gender mainstreaming through empowering women to have the capacity and perspective concerning climate change and risk sensitive development.
The BR Project conceptually believes in deliberative process as good disaster risk governance practice. Some other agendas include: First, stakeholders identification and analysis; Second, Capacity building through trainings, meetings, discussion, workshops, seminars and creating meeting points where the grassroots can also meet other stakeholders. Third, Facilitating multi-stakeholder members to discuss, debate and agenda setting concerning field action and policy advocacy for local DRR regulation the need for establishing a BPBD and Fourth, To facilitate a DRR action plan for East Flores district.

In regards to labor inputs, the BR project have allocated resource such as “local government facilitator” whose tasks is to ensure capacity development processes and create demands for DRR from within the local governments and “community facilitators” whose mandates is to ensure capacity building at villages levels.

The community facilitators facilitate the establishment of disaster preparedness groups as the motivators, at the village level (through village disaster preparedness teams) and school level (through school disaster preparedness team). The other facilitators delivered services include the implementation of participatory hazard vulnerability and capacity analysis, disaster management training, disaster response simulation and drilling, establishment of village disaster preparedness team, community based action plan and integration of DRR into annual budget plan of the villages.

Figure 2 DRR Policy Advocacy Network in East Flores 2009-2011

Figure 2 visualizes the actual network concerning efforts for local disaster risk management reform in East Flores. The size of the nodes reflected the number of the links each node possesses. The higher the links a node possess the higher the size of the nodes.

The formal launching of the project at local government office with positive remarks delivered by the head of district (Bupati). The project encouraged stakeholder participation.
in the East Flores DRR Working Group Lamaholot. Other actors include non-government parties such as Larantuka Red Cross, Tagana (disaster response force under Local Social Department), the scout, a local university and NGO activists.

For NGOs like YPPS, disaster risk management training is not simply a training event where knowledge is simply delivered and ideas are shared among trainers-participants and participants to participants. In fact, a training event can be capitalized into building new commitment to solve local government problems and local issues. Follow up agendas were drafted, consulted and agreed. The DRM training on 19-22 March 2011 in Weri (Flores Island) provided opportunities for the participants to follow up some DRR reform agenda in the next meeting at Local Planning Office (BAPPEDA) on 06 Feb 2010. The meeting at BAPPEDA marked the birth of DRR Working Group (a.k.a. DRR Forum).

All the yellow nodes in Figure 2 were the activities supported by YPPS’s BR Project. The project has facilitated coordination among the DRR WG Lamaholot (or sometimes known as East Flores Disaster Preparedness Forum). It has encouraged the Forum to draft action plan, including advocacy plan regarding the establishment of local disaster management agency (BPBD) as well as legal drafting for disaster management regulation in East Flores.

In March 2010, the project conducted a two-day seminar. The seminar highlighted the importance of linking DRR and local development. In addition, the seminar introduced the concepts concerning legal drafting processes in regards to DRR reform. The seminar had built commitment to establish a DRR legal drafting team namely “Team 3.” The team worked effectively to draft a Perda which was brought into the consolidation meeting between all the stakeholders in May 2010.

Representatives from the empowered communities (selected members of village disaster preparedness team) and empowered local government staff had joined the forum in a hearing process where their aspirations were raised. For the local legislators, this process was seen as the use of their rights to initiate a local regulation. The results from the consolidation meeting were reviewed and the ‘Team 3’ together with the Forum (DRR Working Group Lamaholot) conducted formal hearing at local legislative body in June 2010. To help structuring and enriching the reasoning for DRR reform, the project helped the forum through the use of subject matter expert (SME) especially in providing inputs concerning DRM legal drafting and supporting arguments in an academic paper. The hired consultant together with the Forum members, team members of BR Project and the representatives of the community successfully formulated legal drafts used in the public consultation. The drafts were proposed to the DPRD East Flores (Local Legislative Body or Local House of Representative). At this stage, the results from hazard, vulnerability and capacity analysis has been used as reference to enrich the academic draft.

It took three months for the actors to develop two legal drafts for public consultation in September 2010 where academic paper was also reviewed and revised. During this time, the DPRD (local legislator) once again encouraged to exercise their rights for the initiation of district legal drafting and once again encouraged to discuss (and/or lobby) with the local executive government to agree on the drafts.

Through YPPS and collaboration among all the stakeholders, the project have been able to persuade the legislative and the executive agency endorsing the District Law on Implementation of Disaster Risk Reduction in Flores Timur (EFLL No 2/2011) and District Law

YPPS has been utilizing different scenarios to legitimize DRM reform process by involving wider civil society organization including religious leaders. Given the strategic roles of the religious institution in East Flores, the involvement of some Catholic priests as resource persons in the training processes is one indication of building legitimacy. What is not seen in the Figure 2 is the fact that YPPS is also part of pre-existing CSOs networks in Flores such as FIRD (Flores Institute for Rural Development).

“The local government fully supported the project because they believe that it will bring benefit to the people of Flores Timur” argued by one YPPS staff. However, one additional point worth noted is that the project started one year before the local government election in 2010. This might create certain condition where rational people in power (who have ambition for the next round for Bupati position) should be cooperative with strong civil society groups such as YPPS and its network. The same reason is applied for the legislative members whose interest is to capture the grassroots aspiration in order to be reelected in the next period.

Government representative has been ‘granted’ joint leadership with civil society actors in DRR Working Group. The coordinator was a civil servant and the deputy coordinator is from an NGO namely YASPENSEL (Foundation for Social Economic Development, based in Larantuka), which have been in existence since 1979. YPPS as the project holder has functioned as daily executive that host all the logistical supply and needs for the reform. The mixed stakeholders in Figure 2 means representatives from local government agencies such as Planning Office (Bappeda), local police and others from media and civil society organizations and the grass roots. YPPS views village response team as part of the Working Group structure and part of necessary actors which provide stronger legitimacy in the deliberation of DRR policy reform.

Intensive lobbying made by YPPS to the district head (Bupati) has led to a good commitment from the Bupati to support the project. The launch of the project was officially endorsed by Bupati of East Flores in Dec 2009. This process provide a greater legitimacy for participation from local government unites (a.k.a. SKPD) under the Bupati office such as Health Department, Environmental Protection Agency, Local Planning Agency and others in the East Flores DRR Working Group. Police and others have also been involved. Extensive and intensive consultations and the inclusion of multiple actors including the grassroots can be evidence of the ‘process legitimacy’ where every voice counts.

The reputation of YPPS and its higher level network (such as connection with Yaspenesel, Oxfam, Catholic Church, FIRD and others) also provide certain form of legitimacy which is called here as ‘network legitimacy’. High buy in from both executive and legislative agency were due to their ‘strategy’ to embed ‘ownership’ in the process and the vision from the beginning to the end. The use of sub-district office as the venue for the launching of the project and the availability of Bupati as well as the involvement of local government staff in the disaster management training activities has been the evidence of YPPS exercise in shaping the legitimacy. The endorsement from the legislative agency is justified as the exercise of the legislators’ right to initiate a new law.

The district regulation on BPBD has been enacted since February 2011. This marks significant achievement in formal policy reform. However the BPBD organization has not
been actually established as mandated by the Perda Law No 5/2011. There is delay in the enforcement of the Perda. The recent local election of Bupati has delayed the process. While this delay is justifiable, it is important to note that the real commitment from local government is often volatile.²

5. Discussion

The cases from national level (Section 3) and local level (Section 4) have demonstrated the roles of CSOs in the policy arenas.

YPPS has implicitly exercised disaster risk governance concept. Nevertheless, the concept is embedded in the project design including its logical framework (YPPS 2009). The reality suggests that local government does not have all the necessary capacity (funds, human resources, knowledge and information) to protect its citizen in regards to disaster risks. Civil society organizations, grass roots and other non-state actors have their own mandates (granted by their own values – be it humanitarian or human rights imperatives) in disaster reduction. In their own words, both YPPS-Oxfam framed the disaster risk governance as “disaster is everybody’s business” (Baran and Usfomeny 2011). The BR project design has been geared towards multi-stakeholder involvement and the creation of local forum to promote DRR to broader relevant audiences.

Section 3 and 4 provide evidence at both national and local levels that there have been an imprinted legitimacy demonstrated by the cases above. It can be said that national DRR-PMP has been deliberative to achieve a good ‘process legitimacy’ where different concern were raised. The use of science (through subject matter expert) that inform the policy involvements of academics signal the notion of ‘knowledge legitimacy’ building in the DRR-DMP.

The results of DRR policy reform in East Flores has been gained through a deliberative process which encouraged multi-stakeholders involvements (e.g. executive government, legislative agency, civil society organization, religious organization, community based organization, expert knowledge and distanced donors). These forms of engagement are the mixture of ‘political legitimacy,’ ‘process legitimacy’ and ‘knowledge legitimacy.’ The knowledge legitimacy was made through the involvement of local university as part of the DRR Working Group as well as the provision of technical expert and the uptake of grass roots’ knowledge based on YPPS participatory hazard and vulnerability assessment.

The involvements of international actors including international NGOs and local level NGOs have confirmed the use of DRR governance concept in the local reality. It in fact confirms the prevailing concept of risk governance theory (Renn and Walker 2008, Renn 2008, UNDP 2004, Rayner 2007).

As a result of DRR reform at the national level, the newly established National Disaster Management Agency has superseded the Bakornas, the past coordinating agency for

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² When this paper was written, the project was still ongoing and would be completed in May 2012. YPPS together with DRR Forum have scheduled a hearing agenda with the newly elected Regency Head and the Legal Division of the Local Government. This is to ensure that the newly elected and selected officials to be consistent with the commitment in mandates of Local Regulation No. 2/2011 on the Disaster Management in East Flores Regency and the Local Regulation No. 5/2011 regarding BPBD East Flores.
disaster management. At the provincial and district levels, the mission is placed at the Local Disaster Management Agency (hereinafter BPBDs).

At the national level, there is a National DRR platform, which is indeed a predecessor of a multi-stakeholder forum formed in 2005 with the purpose of advocacy for the drafting of the disaster management law. At the local level, especially at the provincial level a provincial platform is seen as the key to sustain the efforts in risk reduction. The very idea of such a platform is rooted in the Hyogo Framework for Action and this is an ideal structure that when it is expected to materialize in 33 provinces needs a really a challenge. The disaster risk management structure recognizes the roles of civil society organizations as well as the need for a strong partnership with private organizations. At the local level (East Flores), a similar structure is utilized with a clear demand to get a DRR platform established which later on played important roles in actual DRR-PMP.

6. Final Remarks

We argue that SNA can be used to demonstrate the network of disaster risk governance at any level of governance as it provides a new thinking that institutions do exist in a network rather than the sum of laws/regulations/codes. Furthermore, the SNA analysis has demonstrated the idea of polycentric nature of DRR governance. We can conclude that disaster risk governance concept suggests that the totality of risk reduction is a result of public action (or government action), market action (e.g. through risk insurance), and civil society action. Civil society action can be individual action and collective action of citizens as well as participation of CSOs. Risk governance concept captures the reality of diverse actors, diverse knowledge claims and complexity of actors.

7. Reference


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